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Identifying the Determinants of Electoral Integrity and Administration in Advanced 
Democracies: The Case of Britain 
 
Abstract 
 
Much discussion of electoral integrity focuses on new democracies. This paper explores the 
determinants of electoral integrity in a major established democracy in order to begin to 
identify drivers of electoral integrity for comparative scholars to exploit further. It does so 
through a novel measure of electoral administration in Britain which is brought together with 
comprehensive data on: spending on electoral administration; whether concurrent elections 
were being held; size of electorate; number of constituencies administered; type of 
administration overseeing local electoral administration; and various socio-economic 
measures. The results establish a range of relationships to electoral integrity which will inform 
subsequent debates on election quality in other democracies, whether advanced or otherwise. 
In particular, the findings point to the importance of administrative resources in delivering 
electoral integrity in advanced democracies.  
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Identifying the Determinants of Electoral Integrity and Administration in Advanced 
Democracies: The Case of Britain1 
 
 
Understanding the integrity of the electoral process is a vital pre-cursor for understanding any 
other aspect of electoral politics. Recognition of this point has led to the development of 
electoral integrity as a lively ‘new agenda’ in political science (Norris, 2013a). Much research 
in this area is often focused upon democratising countries, election observation missions and 
the manipulation of elections in authoritarian regimes. In advanced democracies, the focus has 
remained largely on voting behaviour and party campaigns. This presupposes that the system 
for running elections permits free competition and choice, and is not biased or flawed for 
electors. This cannot be taken for granted; a range of recent difficulties in electoral processes 
in advanced democracies have highlighted the need for an examination of electoral integrity in 
such contexts (Alvarez and Hall, 2006; Clark, 2015; James, 2012; Wise 2001). In particular, it 
is important to establish variance in the integrity of the electoral process, and to understand 
what factors may drive or impede the delivery of high quality elections in such democracies.  
The paper’s major contribution is to present a multivariate analysis of various aspects 
which might impact on election quality in advanced democracies. It approaches this through 
an index of election administration derived from election administrators’ performance 
standards in the 2010 British general election. The index is brought together with a range of 
contextual data, including electoral, geographical and socio-economic variables, to provide an 
exploratory analysis of which factors may be more or less important in driving election quality 
in advanced democracies. Britain is typical of several advanced democracies, notably the 
United States but also smaller democracies like Ireland, in that local electoral officials have the 
main responsibility for delivering elections. Even where central government oversees elections, 
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there is often still a sizeable role for local government in delivering those elections. 
Consequently, considerable variation in standards of electoral administration can exist. Britain 
is therefore an excellent case study for building both theory and knowledge about the 
relationship between electoral integrity and its determinants. Such a multivariate analysis in an 
advanced democracy during a national parliamentary general election is extremely rare. The 
findings are important because evidence from such a case can be utilized comparatively to 
interrogate these issues in other advanced democracies. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the broad concept of 
electoral integrity, before focusing more narrowly on the crucial aspect of electoral 
administration and its contribution to election quality. The second section discusses some 
potential contextual issues that may impact on the provision of high quality elections. These 
include, for example: the size of the electorate, a number of electoral structure variables, the 
amount spent on electoral administration, and institutional and socio-economic variables. A 
number of hypotheses are derived from these ideas. The third section introduces the data 
utilised in this study, while the fourth section analyses these data. The conclusion reflects on 
the implications of these findings.  
 
Electoral Integrity and Electoral Administration             
 
The integrity of the electoral process and the potential for manipulation or malpractice to occur 
has long been a concern for policymakers and politicians. Scholars are now catching up with 
such questions and how they might affect electoral choice and competition (Birch, 2011; 
Norris, 2014; Norris et al., 2014). Students of democratisation and electoral autocracies have, 
to date, taken these questions most seriously. In potentially high conflict political situations, 
the integrity, fairness and transparency of the process can all be disputed and have the potential 
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to lead to, at best, manipulations of political behaviour, or at worst, challenges to the legitimacy 
of results and widespread violence (Birch, 2011, Norris, 2014). In contrast, in advanced 
democracies with long experience of running elections, the quality of the electoral process has 
tended to be taken for granted. This largely remains the case, despite an upsurge of interest in 
the operation of electoral processes in the United States in the aftermath of the controversial 
2000 Bush-Gore presidential election (Hasen, 2012; Montjoy, 2008; Wise, 2001). Evidence 
from elsewhere is sporadic, with the other major advanced democracy receiving any sustained, 
albeit limited, levels of attention being Britain (Clark 2014a, 2015; James, 2012; 2013; Norris, 
2014: 5 & 32; Wilks-Heeg, 2009). 
 Electoral integrity can be approached from either a broad or more narrowly defined 
perspective. Having universal suffrage and free, competitive and fair elections is a minimal 
requirement and essential component of the quality of democracy (Morlino, 2004). 
Consequently, recent accounts define electoral integrity as being rooted in ‘international 
conventions and global norms, applying universally to all countries worldwide throughout the 
electoral cycle, including during the pre-electoral period, the campaign, on polling day and on 
its aftermath’ (Norris, 2013a, b). Such norms emphasise fundamental freedoms, democracy 
promotion and human rights, without which elections cannot be classified as ‘free and fair’.  
A distinction can be made between first and second order integrity issues (Norris, 
2013a; Vickery and Shein, 2012). First order issues revolve around violations of these generally 
accepted freedoms, which may end in political violence. Second order malpractices 
‘characteristically involve more mundane issues of maladministration, lack of technical 
capacity or human error’ (Norris, 2013a: 566). The argument is that electoral integrity requires 
both sets of issues to be present, but that second order issues are not enough, on their own, to 
provide integrity (Norris, 2014: 36).  
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An important difficulty with this distinction is that it is often these narrower ‘second 
order’ administrative issues which can give political actors the excuse to claim electoral fraud, 
bring democratic processes into disrepute and ultimately lead to controversial outcomes, 
whether through violent or other means (Minnite, 2010). The notion of these being mundane 
administrative ‘second order’ malpractices appears to downplay this.  
Exploring linkages between integrity in public affairs and public administration, Evans 
(2012) argues that integrity is evident where governance has: stable governing parameters; 
accountability; transparency; competence; anti-corruption measures; and a focus on public 
value. These are all delivered through administrative processes. In democracies, the 
administration of the electoral process delivers the public good of elections held under 
universal suffrage. It also sets the various parameters by which elections are run, such as the 
legal framework for conducting elections, accountability and transparency mechanisms such 
as independent observation, and enforcement measures in case of disputes (ACE Project, n.d.). 
Indeed, Elklit (1999) shows how the effective implementation of electoral administrative 
processes, throughout the electoral cycle, can play a crucial role in delivering high quality 
elections. More generally, poor performance in electoral administration can lead to a range of 
negative consequences such as disenfranchisement, skewed electoral outcomes and electoral 
violence. It can also impact negatively on confidence in the democratic process (Atkeson and 
Saunders, 2007). While electoral integrity may, more broadly, consist of global norms, whether 
in democratising countries or advanced democracies, it cannot therefore exist without fair, 
transparent, inclusive and equitable election administration which provides an effective and 
reliable aggregation of the vote (ACE Project, n.d.; Birch, 2011; Schaffer, 2008).   
Running elections for a mass electorate is highly complex. Demands on electoral 
administrators are often intense, but also intermittent, with many aspects having to be organised 
to extremely tight timescales. For a national election, manifold logistical and organisational 
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tasks must be undertaken with minimal difficulties to run the contest effectively. 
Administrators must comply with electoral legislation, recruit, train and manage large numbers 
of staff, many of which are non-specialists only employed for the short-term conduct of the 
election, and also ensure that an accurate electoral register is compiled. Polling stations must 
also be located and equipped properly. Finally, when polls close, the counting and tabulation 
process must take place securely and transparently.  
Potential difficulties abound. Alvarez and Hall (2006) note principal-agent problems in 
running elections. Mozzafar and Schedler (2002) highlight tensions between administrative 
efficiency, political neutrality and public accountability that election administrators must seek 
to balance. Others have suggested that the complexity of elections make them prone to what 
might be termed ‘normal accidents’, the propensity for complexity and pressure to deliver 
leading to errors in implementation each of which may, on their own, be relatively small but 
can multiply into a much bigger issue (Montjoy, 2008; Perrow, 1999). While this might appear 
to require central co-ordination and planning, in most advanced democracies, voting is, of 
necessity, something that occurs in voters’ local areas. Integrity, therefore, also depends on 
how elections are locally implemented. Poll workers in local areas administering elections can 
thus be seen as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Clark and James, 2015; Kimball and Kropf, 2006). 
Consequently, localised standards can vary considerably, rendering perceptions of the electoral 
process as, at best, not uniform, and, at worst, threatening the entire credibility of the process 
(Atkeson and Saunders, 2007; Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2014; Hall et al., 2007). 
A number of checklists have been proposed to allow an assessment of electoral 
administration. Elklit and Reynolds (2001; 2005) highlight twelve steps in the electoral process 
and, in their different versions, subdivide these steps into between 47 and 54 different variables 
for observers to assess.2 For instance, in relation to voter registration, their steps include 
assessing the ease of registration for voters, the freedom from any bias in the franchise, 
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mechanisms for auditing the register and ensuring public confidence, and that these processes 
comply with international standards. Essential, important and desirable characteristics of 
electoral integrity are all given weightings according to their importance in their schema. Pastor 
(1999) offers a framework with pre-election, election and post-election phases with 22 
indicators in total for application to developing countries. Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) 
provide a threefold categorisation of rule-making (i.e. the rules of electoral competition and 
governance), rule application (i.e. organising the election process) and rule adjudication 
(certifying results and resolving disputes).  
Implicit in many of these frameworks is the idea that the administrative aspects of 
electoral integrity can be combined to provide an overall assessment of a set of elections.  For 
example, Elklit (1999: 37) talks of a combined election quality measurement where states can 
record high or low scores. Similarly, Norris (2014: 32-33 & 66) discusses how continuous 
measures can be applied to assess all types of democracies, including those with extensive 
experience of conducting elections.  From an advanced democracy perspective, the utility of 
such an approach has been strongly advocated by Gerken (2009). She argues that too little is 
known about the state of electoral administration and its consequences, whether good or bad, 
with much data either often difficult to collect or simply unknown. Gerken’s solution is a 
‘democracy index’ which focuses on the administrative issues of registration, balloting and 
counting. It would provide potentially both a national level assessment, and one which 
highlights variation between states and localities. Elklit and Reynolds (2005: 155-6) highlight 
the utility of such an approach for cross-national comparisons and for different types of 
democracies. Such variation could be used to highlight best practice and to improve electoral 
processes in localities or countries showing substantial variation from this. Moreover, a 
democracy index would provide incentives which encourage the improvement of electoral 
administration.  
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Influences on the Quality of Electoral Administration 
  
If the aim of such an index is to measure variation in election quality in advanced democracies, 
what factors may determine or be associated with higher or lower levels of performance in 
election administration? Despite the numerous frameworks described above, analysts have 
little empirical evidence on what may drive higher levels of performance in election 
administration in advanced democracies.3 A number of determinants can nevertheless be 
suggested.  
The first group of determinants relate to the electoral structure of the local area the 
election is being administered in. Three things might conceivably impact upon the quality of 
electoral administration in this regard. Firstly, the size and concentration of the electorate being 
administered is important, with larger electorates arguably adding more pressures on electoral 
administrators, and smaller electorates easier to manage. Secondly, in many countries, elections 
to different levels of government are held concurrently. This certainly complicates things for 
political parties (Clark, 2012). It is also likely to add to pressures on administrators, to the 
detriment of election quality. Thirdly, in a number of electoral systems such as single member 
plurality (SMP) and mixed-member proportional (MMP), electoral administrators may be 
running more than one geographical constituency or area. Doing so is likely to add further 
complications for administrators and as a consequence, this may lead to lower levels of 
performance.  
These electoral structure ideas provide a number of hypotheses that can be tested 
against an index of election administration. These are that: 
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H1: Electoral management performance improves when smaller local electorates are 
being administered; 
 
H2: Electoral management performance improves when only one type of election is being 
administered; 
 
H3: Electoral management performance improves when only one constituency or local 
area is being administered. 
 
 Electoral administrative performance is influenced by its relationship with the broader 
environment of public administration within which it operates (Hale and Slaton, 2008). The 
second group of factors that may influence performance on any index of electoral 
administration therefore relate to what might be termed organisational or institutional factors. 
These issues involve the administrative form the local authority administering the elections 
takes, the party political composition of the council, or the level of resources that local 
authorities employ on election administration. Firstly, practitioner analyses suggest that the 
type of local authority administering the elections can be associated with differential levels of 
performance on different aspects of election administration (Electoral Commission, 2009b; 
2010; Rosenblatt et al., 2012; Snelling, 2015). However, taking a broader public administration 
approach, Murphy et al. (2011) tested for differences between different types of local 
authorities on a performance assessment regime attempting to measure the Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA) of English local government between 2002-2009. They found 
little difference between different types of authority, arguing that variation occurred as much 
between as within different types of local government structures. These contradictory findings 
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therefore suggest that establishing whether or not the institutional type of local authority may 
have an impact on electoral management performance is important.    
The partisan composition of the local authority has been shown to have a potential 
impact upon local public policy outputs and local authority capacity (Andrews and Boyne, 
2011). Consequently, partisan composition may also impact upon performance on electoral 
administration capacity, due to choices made by local authorities. Certain parties may place 
more emphasis on electoral administration than others, with potential partisan effects. Thus, 
American electoral administration has been criticised for its partisan nature, and the impact of 
this upon electoral processes (Kimball and Kropf, 2006). The general perception is that broadly 
liberal or left-leaning parties are more concerned with using electoral administration to widen 
participation, while right-leaning parties are more restrictive (Hasen, 2012; Kimball and Kropf, 
2006). This requires qualification in some contexts. Returning officers (ROs) running and 
administering elections in British local government are non-partisan civil servants. They are 
expected to perform their duties impartially without heed to partisan loyalties. However, the 
partisan make-up of the local authority may still be relevant because the governing party or 
parties are in a position to decide priorities and can, should they choose, put a greater or lesser 
emphasis on the provision of electoral services.      
 Thirdly, the question of resources is often highlighted as crucial, albeit in a negative 
way. Birch (2011: 26) suggests a link between electoral mispractice which evolves from a lack 
of resources in her comparative study. Pastor (1999) argues that in developing countries, a 
causal chain links weak spending on public administration and poor performance in electoral 
processes. This argument has also been made in advanced democracies. Hall and Tokaji (2007) 
and Gerken (2009: 118) both suggest that electoral administration in the USA is inadequately 
financed. The Chair of the UK Electoral Commission similarly notes inconsistencies 
throughout the UK in the amount available to fund electoral administration, indicating that this 
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impacts upon the service received by voters on polling day (Watson, 2011: 139; James, 2013; 
Wilks-Heeg, 2009). Increasing demands from new legislation, technology and practices all 
stretch scarce finances and resources for electoral administration even further (Montjoy, 2010). 
Mostly these arguments are based on assertion, but, in a rare data-driven analysis, Clark 
(2014a) suggests there is a positive relationship between spending on election administration 
and higher levels of performance in electoral management. 
 These institutional and organisational issues provide further hypotheses that can be 
tested against an index of electoral administration. These are that: 
 
H4: Differences in institutional type of local authority will impact independently on 
electoral management performance. 
 
H5: Electoral management performance is positively related to the proportion of seats 
held by liberal/centre-left parties on the local authority. 
 
H6: Electoral management performance improves with more spending on electoral 
administration.   
 
 The final issue that might be examined is whether any potential influences may be 
exogenous in nature. Andrews et al. (2005) found that poor performance in the local authority 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment was significantly influenced by exogenous factors 
such as social structure. This can be applied to electoral administration; socio-demographics 
are regularly associated with problems of electoral registration, particularly with mobile or 
‘hard to reach’ groups such as students, immigrants and the less well-off (James, 2014; 
Rosenblatt et al., 2012). The Electoral Commission (2010), for instance, associated lower rates 
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of registration with cities with large student populations, population movement and 
deprivation. Local activities are central tool in reaching these groups (Snelling, 2015). These 
ideas provide a final hypothesis. This is that: 
 
H7: There is a negative relationship between demographic groups who are hard to reach 
and higher levels of performance in election quality.    
 
Electoral Integrity in Britain 
 
Insights into these broad theoretical questions can be provided by examining the performance 
of British electoral administrators. Britain is an excellent case for doing so. Like a number of 
advanced democracies, British elections are administered by local authorities who have 
discretion, within statutory requirements, in determining how elections are implemented. This 
is the case also in both the United States and Canada, as well as smaller democracies such as 
Ireland (James, 2012; OSCE/ODIHR, 2015). Even where a national government body is 
responsible overall for election conduct, local authorities can have considerable 
responsibilities. For example, Italy’s Interior Ministry has overall responsibility, but the actual 
process is delivered via district and regional election offices alongside more than 81,000 
municipal election offices. Observation reports show clear variation at this local level 
(OSCE/ODIHR, 2008; 2013). Similarly, German elections are delivered via a structure which 
reaches down to the local electoral district and precinct (Breunig and Goerres, 2011), French 
local government is responsible for running polling stations, electoral administration and 
registration (Norris, 2015: 118), and  Australian elections are delivered through divisional 
offices responsible for each electoral division.4 As Norris (2015: 23-24) observes, in both 
nationally organised and also decentralised systems of electoral governance, there is a sizeable 
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role for local authorities in delivering elections. As a consequence, there will also be variation 
in practice and delivery which needs explained.      
Given the dearth of data available to assess and test issues of electoral integrity in 
advanced democracies, and the ubiquity of local authorities in delivering elections in those 
democracies, findings from a British general election are potentially generalizable across 
advanced democracies, and may also inform debates in democratising countries.  
 Although British electoral administration has largely been taken for granted, two factors 
have recently changed this. Firstly, a number of high-profile difficulties in election 
administration in recent years have highlighted both the fragile nature of election quality in 
some places, and, as a consequence, underlined variation in practices across Britain. Examples 
include voters being turned away from some polling stations in a number of cities in the 2010 
general election, an extraordinarily large number of invalid ballots in the 2007 Scottish 
elections, and in 2005, an election court judge likening the conduct and administration of postal 
voting in local elections in Birmingham to that of ‘a Banana Republic’ (Clark, 2015; Denver 
et al., 2009; James, 2010; Stewart, 2006; Wilks-Heeg, 2009). Indeed, it is often local elections 
which have proved most problematic in Britain, attracting many allegations of electoral 
mispractice (Sobolewska et al., 2015, 11; Wilks-Heeg, 2009). The toughest test for election 
administrators is nevertheless a national general election. Watson (2011: 129) observes that 
nearly 24 million votes were cast in around 40,000 polling stations in the 2010 general election, 
with 5.8 million postal votes also being cast. A further 13.6 million votes were also cast in local 
elections in parts of England on the same day in 2010.  
 Secondly, since the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA) 2000, 
the UK has had an Electoral Commission responsible for overseeing numerous aspects of the 
electoral process. This reports to parliament, but operates independently.  As part of the 
Commission’s work, increasing amounts of information about the conduct of electoral politics 
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have become publicly available. The Electoral Commission was given the role of overseeing 
both election process spending and setting performance standards in the Electoral 
Administration Act (EAA) 2006.  Their data now therefore include information on both 
performance standards for returning officers (ROs), and electoral registration officers (EROs). 
Electoral Commission data also includes spending on electoral administration. Nevertheless, 
the delivery of electoral administration in Britain ultimately remains the responsibility of local 
government. The Electoral Commission has currently no formal powers of direction over the 
local ROs and EROs who are ultimately responsible for delivering the elections. Consequently, 
there are inevitable variations in both practice and performance in delivering electoral 
administration which need explained (Clark, 2014a, 2015). 
  
Data and Approach 
 
Data for this study are drawn from a range of sources. The key source providing evidence of 
variation in practice amongst electoral administrators is a survey of performance standards for 
returning officers (ROs) in the 2010 British general election. ROs are non-partisan, civil 
servants responsible for the conduct of elections in their local authority area. Data on 
performance standards were based on self-completed surveys of ROs collected by the Electoral 
Commission in the aftermath of the election.5 This survey had a high response rate of 372 out 
of 379 local council ROs who were responsible for running the 2010 general election in the 
632 constituencies in Great Britain. In other words, the analysis is undertaken at the level of 
these local authority returning officers, and based on a response rate of 98 per cent.6  
 It is, of course, possible to raise questions about the use of self-completed 
questionnaires to measure performance standards in public administration. Concerns about 
public administrators seeking to ‘game’ the outcomes of such standards have been evident in 
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the wider literature (Heckman et al, 1997; Heinrich, 2002). Indeed, the OSCE’s election 
observation report on the British general election in 2010 highlighted concern at such self-
completion (OSCE, 2010).  
This notwithstanding, ROs are ideal respondents. They are senior electoral 
administrators responsible for delivering elections to all level of institution, from local 
government to the European parliament, to at least statutory requirements. They can therefore 
be considered expert practitioners in electoral administration. The use of surveys with such 
expert respondents has become widespread in political science. The reliability of such surveys 
has been considered at length, including in the field of electoral integrity (Coma and van Ham, 
2015; Norris, 2014; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007). While acknowledging the necessary 
caveats, findings have underlined the ability of experts to judge aspects of elections. Responses 
to the performance standards survey were also audited by the UK Electoral Commission, albeit 
on a sampled basis (Electoral Commission, 2010). If ROs were systematically overstating 
performance, it might be expected that there would be little variation in responses. As the 
analysis below shows, variation is clearly evident. Combined, this means that the 2010 RO 
performance standards results are relatively reliable indicators of electoral administrative 
performance.                    
These performance standards were used to report on performance in both the 2009 
European and 2010 General elections (Electoral Commission 2009b; 2010a). They revolve 
around three broad areas, from which seven measureable standards were derived. They are 
outlined in table 1.7 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
17 
 
The various frameworks described above tend to use ordinal scales to rate particular 
aspects of election quality (see Norris, 2014: Ch. 3). Elklit and Reynolds (2005), for example, 
adopt a four-point Likert scale to rank their variables of interest. The Electoral Commission 
adopt a similar approach, utilising a three-point ordinal scale of not meeting the standard, 
meeting the standard, and above the standard. In each performance standard, a range of criteria 
are specified that the RO must comply with. Thus, under performance standard 2 on planning 
processes, to fail to meet the standard ROs would have no written formal plan, relying instead 
on experience and informal interactions. To meet the standard, the RO would have a formal 
written plan which includes overall objectives, a risk register, staffing and organising venues 
for polling stations and the count and any contracts for outsourced material (e.g. printing ballot 
papers) to be in place. To be above the standard, the RO has worked with external bodies (e.g. 
local media, community groups and other interested electoral officers) to develop their plans, 
and have an evaluation methodology to establish its effectiveness  (Electoral Commission, 
2009a).8 Performance on each of the individual standards is outlined in table 2. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
 As Norris (2014: 66) observes, continuous or interval level measures are preferable to 
ordinal ones in attempting to measure election quality. The dependent variable utilised in this 
study is therefore an index of election administration. This is derived from RO performance 
standards results reported in the 2010 general election, and inspired by debates around indexing 
election quality mentioned above. It is an additive index, created by summing the scores 
achieved by ROs on each of the seven performance standards, with values of 1 given to not 
meeting the standard, 2 given to meeting the standard and 3 given where ROs were above the 
standard. The resulting index therefore potentially varies between a minimum score of 7 and a 
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maximum of 21. Reliability analysis achieved a Cronbach’s Alpha score of .765. This indicates 
that these standards are suitable for index construction (Pennings et al., 1999: 96-97).9             
                 
     It is worth noting that the Electoral Commission declined the opportunity to create such 
an overall index, claiming that this would ‘maintain transparency and simplicity ... aggregating 
the total number of standards not met, met or exceeded across all seven standards may not give 
an accurate picture of performance’ (Electoral Commission, 2009b: 8). Nevertheless, such an 
aggregate approach has been utilised in relation to performance standards data before in British 
local government, notably the 2002-09 Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) 
(Andrews et al., 2005). Such an approach is therefore accepted in assessing public 
administration in Britain. 
  Consideration was given to weighting these standards. However, deficiencies in any 
aspect can cause complications and difficulties with the electoral process. Many difficulties 
can be attributed to poor planning, while accessibility of information to electors would seem to 
be crucial for voters to be well informed about the process. Indeed, Elklit (1999) makes this 
point by arguing that, if polling day is to run smoothly, it is pre-election administration that is 
arguably crucial in leading to high quality elections. In the absence of any accepted weighting 
standard, the approach adopted here has weighted each aspect equally.        
The index offers an important advance on what is currently known in three ways. It 
provides more variation than permitted by the performance standards as originally reported. It 
permits an overall view of electoral administration to be obtained, while also enabling easier 
comparison of standards between different types of local government and areas within Britain 
than hitherto possible. Crucially, this provides an indicator against which potential drivers of 
performance can be assessed. 
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 A number of indicators are utilised as independent variables. Three electoral structure 
variables are deployed. Firstly, electorate density is a proxy variable for the size and 
concentration of the electorate served by each local authority. This is based on a ratio of the 
number of electors in the area administered divided by the local authority size in hectares and 
calculated from the electorate and hectare data in the Electoral Commission’s electoral costs 
data. Secondly, whether the local authority was administering local elections concurrently with 
the general election is assessed by a simple yes/no indicator (coded as a dummy variable 1-
0).10 Finally, whether ROs were responsible for multiple constituencies is also measured by 
use of a dichotomous yes/no variable (also coded 1-0).11 
 Three sets of independent variables are utilised for institutional and resource issues. 
There are a range of different council types in Britain: Scottish and Welsh unitary councils; 
London Boroughs; unitary county; unitary district; metropolitan district; and two-tier district 
councils. These are represented by dummy variables for each different type of council 
administration. Partisanship on the local authority is measured by the proportion of seats on 
the local authority held by Labour and the Liberal Democrats at the immediate round of 
elections prior to 2010.12 Both parties have shown concern with electoral administration. 
Labour in office sought to change a range of electoral practices to increase turnout (James, 
2010), while issues of electoral reform have long been a Liberal Democrat concern.13 Local 
authority level data on spending on election administration in 2010-11, which covers the period 
of the 2010 general election, are deployed as a proxy variable for the resources election 
administrators can bring to bear on running the election, calculated as spending per elector. 
This is a composite variable of the total amount spent by local authorities on electoral 
registration in the period, combined with the total amount spent on the actual practicalities of 
running the election, divided by the local authority electorate. These electoral spending data 
are drawn from the Electoral Commission’s Financial Information Survey, which was designed 
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to collect information on the financing of elections across Britain.  This was a full population 
survey of local authority election administrators with a high response rate (82.8 per cent; 
N=378).14  
 The final group of independent variables are essentially socio-demographic and 
geographical in nature. The effect of transient or migratory ‘hard to reach’ populations is 
measured by two variables: the level of internal migration (i.e. within the UK) experienced by 
that local authority in 2010; and the proportion of students in the local authority area. Final 
variables utilised as a proxies for hard to reach populations are the proportion of long term 
unemployed, never worked and routine workers in the local authority area. With the exception 
of internal migration, which is an estimate from the Office of National Statistics, these 
measures are based on Census 2001 data measured at the level of the local authority.15       
 
Analysis 
 
As table 3 demonstrates, scores on the index vary between 11 at the lower end of performance, 
to the maximum score possible of 21 at the top end of performance. The mean score on the 
index was 15.8, with a standard deviation of 2.2. This means that most ROs score somewhere 
between 13.6 and 17.9 on the index. In total, 38 ROs fall outside the standard deviation score 
at the bottom end of the index, while 82 ROs fall outside it at the top end of the index with 
eleven ROs achieving the maximum score of 21. In other words, more than half of ROs (191 
or 51.3%) are located below the mean on the integrity index, while the remaining 180 or 48.7% 
perform above average. The modal value on the index is 14, with a median of 15. There is a 
slight positive skew of .489 in the index, but this does not appear to be serious. Consequently, 
the results can effectively be taken as a normal distribution and suitable for subsequent analysis 
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(Andersen, 2004). Table 3 also presents the descriptive statistics for the independent variables 
utilised in the analysis.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
 Statistically significant bivariate relationships are evident between the electoral 
administration index and some of the independent variables. Taking the electoral structure 
variables first, responsibility for multiple constituencies seemed to have an impact in 2010.  
Around 154 ROs ran multiple constituencies and they recorded a mean of 16.2 on the index, 
compared with a mean of 15.5 for those only running one constituency. This difference was 
statistically significant at the p<.01 level. The other electoral structure variables did not have a 
statistically significant relationship to the integrity index. 
 With the organisational and resourcing variables, type of local administration seemed 
to make a difference. There is evident variation of performance between the different types of 
local authority. This ranges from a score of 16.7 for Scottish unitary councils at the high end 
of performance, to 15.4 for two-tier district councils at the bottom end. While strength of 
association is not strong, with an eta value of just .205, results assessing types of local authority 
were statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. This suggests that differences between council 
types may be systematic. Spending on election administration per elector also appeared to make 
a difference. Bivariate analysis returned a positive Pearson correlation of .160 which was 
statistically significant at the p<.01 level, thereby underlining the view that more spending on 
election administration improves election quality. There is however no statistically significant 
bivariate relationship with partisanship. Finally, none of the demographic or socio-economic 
variables had a statistically significant relationship to the integrity index, although the 
proportion of those who have never worked came close at .055.  
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   Table 4 presents three exploratory OLS multiple regression models which begin to 
tease out which variables may be most important while at the same time controlling for others.16 
Model 1 examines the electoral structure, with electoral density, and dummy variables included 
for concurrent elections and multiple constituencies. Model 2 adds institutional and resource 
issues in the form of council type, partisanship and the amount spent on election administration 
per elector to the analysis, with dummy variables representing the various different council 
types administering elections in Britain.17 Model 3 adds socio-economic variables to the 
electoral structure and some institutional variables. Because of the relatively low N, statistical 
significance is also tested for at the slightly more relaxed level of p<0.1 in addition to the 
standard p<.01 and p<.05 levels.   
 
(Table 4 about here) 
   
Model 1 initially appears to highlight the importance of the electoral structure of the 
area that the RO is administering to levels of electoral integrity in the locality. Electorate 
density has no independent statistically significant impact, thereby suggesting that electorate 
size is not necessarily a driver of election quality and permitting the rejection of hypothesis 1. 
Instead, and contrary to the bivariate analysis, both concurrent elections and running multiple 
constituencies have statistically significant relationships with the integrity index. The analysis 
suggests that hypothesis 2 can be confirmed. Running concurrent elections led to lower levels 
of performance on the index in 2010, a relationship which is statistically significant albeit at 
the slightly lower level of significance of 0.1.18 This is suggestive of the fact that the addition 
of an extra round of elections, while often justified on the grounds of saving on election costs 
and boosting turnout, actually has a hidden cost in terms of poorer quality elections given that 
ROs are managing two different sets of processes and votes over the same period of time. Given 
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that local elections have had many difficulties, this would seem to be a potentially important 
finding. There are clear examples to illustrate this across the UK.  In 2014 there were numerous 
problems in Tower Hamlets council in London, which appeared, in part, to be due to having to 
administer the count for several concurrent elections for the European parliament, the council 
and for local mayor (BBC, 2014).19 Similar complaints have been made in Northern Ireland 
(Electoral Commission, 2011).    
Contrary to hypothesis 3, which suggests that higher levels of performance would be 
evident where only one constituency is being administered, running multiple constituencies has 
a positive relationship with the integrity index which is statistically significant at the p<.01 
level. This underlines the bivariate finding. However, it is unclear why this might be the case. 
One possible reason might be that extra resources, for instance in terms of higher numbers of 
staff, are involved in the election leading to such a positive effect. This idea is supported by 
the fact that ROs with responsibilities for multiple constituencies were better financially 
resourced. They spent on average £730,943 on election administration in 2010-11, more than 
double the £344,320 for ROs who administered only one constituency.20 Indeed, it might be 
that the results from both electoral structural variables can be explained by resources or the 
relative lack of them. While ROs running concurrent elections also typically spent more than 
those not doing so, the magnitude of difference was much less, having only around 44% more 
resources whereas those running multiple constituencies had typically more than double the 
resources available to those only administering one constituency.21 Staffing issues, the key 
expenditure cost in electoral administration, are typically cited in such cases (BBC, 2014; 
Electoral Commission, 2011).       
Model 2, tests hypotheses relating to local authority organisation, partisanship and 
resources expended on electoral administration. The directionality of findings from hypotheses 
2 & 3 in model 1 are retained in this second model, albeit at a weaker level of significance for 
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multiple constituencies. Examining the type of local authority administering the elections, 
hypothesis 4 can essentially be rejected. One type of local authority, Scottish Unitary councils, 
has a statistically significant relationship with election quality, albeit this is weak at the p<.1 
level. This is likely to be explained by slightly different electoral arrangements in Scotland than 
elsewhere in Britain (Clark, 2015). The other types of local authority have no independent 
statistically significant relationship to the dependent variable. Similarly, partisanship has no 
independent statistically significant effect on election quality in model 2 permitting the 
rejection of hypothesis 5. Importantly however, the level of resources spent on electoral 
administration per elector does permit the acceptance of hypothesis 6. In other words, the better 
resourced electoral administration is, the more likely it is that higher quality elections will be 
the result. This is statistically significant at the p<.05 level.       
Model 3 includes the socio-economic variables from ‘hard to reach’ groups, and retains 
the electoral structure variables, EA spending per elector, and partisanship.   There is some 
evidence to support hypothesis 7 regarding hard to reach populations, although this is 
somewhat contradictory and tentative. The proportion of long term unemployed has a negative 
relationship, significant at the p<.1 level, while the proportion of those who have never worked 
has a positive relationship, significant at the p<.05 level. Importantly, students and internal 
migration appear to have no statistically significant effects, nor, separately, does partisanship.  
However, the electoral structure variables of multiple constituencies and concurrent elections 
both achieve significance, at the p<.01 level for multiple constituencies and p<.05 level for 
concurrent elections. Both maintain the same directionality as under model 1, with multiple 
constituencies associated with better performance on the electoral administration index and 
concurrent elections leading to lower performance.  Notably, model 3 also highlights the 
importance of spending on election administration per elector in improving election quality. In 
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this model, a positive relationship is statistically significant at the p<.01 level. Hypothesis 6 
therefore receives support in model 3.  
While the effect of EA spending is not overly strong, this is nevertheless an important 
finding, pointing to the assertion made by many scholars and election administrators that lower 
levels of spending may harm election quality (Clark, 2014a; Gerken, 2009; Hall and Tokaji, 
2007; James, 2013; Montjoy, 2010; Watson, 2011; Wilks-Heeg, 2009).22 Given that the major 
part of election administration spending is on staffing (Clark, 2014b; Alvarez and Hall, 2006; 
Montjoy, 2010), this may also underline further, albeit indirectly, the points made above 
regarding staffing, multiple constituencies and concurrent elections. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has provided an important exploratory analysis of some of the factors which may 
drive election quality and integrity in an advanced democracy. This has been based on a rare 
multivariate examination of the performance of election administration in a national 
parliamentary election. The findings have established that, under certain conditions, a number 
of factors may have an impact on election quality in advanced democracies. What follows from 
this if higher quality elections are to be achieved? Several possible issues need to be addressed 
by practitioners and policymakers. Firstly, there needs to be a debate about running concurrent 
elections. The evidence here suggests that holding different types of elections at the same time 
leads to lower quality election administration across Britain. While there may well be benefits 
in terms of higher turnout for ‘second order’ elections when holding them together with other 
contests, there are also clearly costs involved in terms of election quality. Higher turnout is 
somewhat beyond the point if people have problems casting their votes, or having them 
counted. What should take priority is an open question, but the difficulties of concurrent 
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elections need to be acknowledged, both in Britain and elsewhere. Indeed, it is interesting to 
note that one jurisdiction in Britain, Scotland, has already moved away from holding local and 
Scottish parliamentary elections together because of administrative difficulties in 2007. 
Secondly, there is clearly variation in election quality across different local authorities 
throughout Britain. Understanding what local authority electoral departments are doing best, 
what is driving that, whether organisationally within the council or externally, and whether or 
not practice might be improved upon as a consequence is crucial. The Electoral Commission’s 
performance standards are useful, and similar ideas are being adopted for election monitoring 
more generally elsewhere, but more can be done with them. As an example, the index created 
here provides an additional tool for practitioners to understand this variation, and what is 
driving it.  
Thirdly, the findings highlight the importance of resources in electoral administration. 
In short, resources drive capacity, and the more spent on election administration, the higher the 
level of performance in election management is likely to be. Protecting resources for running 
elections during the current austerity squeeze may be challenging. Yet, for electoral integrity 
it is crucial. Spending levels should be maintained, and where local authorities are under-
resourced in this area, efforts made to improve them with support from national-level 
government and other relevant stakeholders. While increases in election quality may only be 
incremental, nevertheless, the additional staff, training, or other changes to practices and 
procedures that such funding may secure could go a long way to avoiding future problems at 
the polls. 
These findings are also important for comparative scholars of electoral integrity. 
Indeed, the importance of this research lies in the fact that this exploratory analysis has begun 
to unravel the drivers and determinants of electoral integrity in advanced democracies. In other 
words, it is a step towards a greater understanding of what works in electoral administration 
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and, ultimately, to improved electoral processes for voters, parties and candidates. Further data 
collection and research across a range of different settings is naturally required in order to test 
these findings elsewhere.    
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Table 1: Performance Standards for Returning Officers in the 2010 general election 
Subject Performance standard 
Planning & organisation 1: Skills & knowledge of returning officer 
 2: Planning processes in place for an election 
 3: Training 
Integrity 4: Maintaining the integrity of an election 
Participation 5: Planning and delivering public awareness activity 
 6: Accessibility of information to electors 
 7: Communication of information to candidates & agents  
Sources: Electoral Commission, 2009a; 2010a: 2.      
 
Table 2: Performance standards in the 2010 general election (%)                                                             
 Not meeting 
standard 
Meeting 
standard 
Above standard N 
Skills & knowledge 1.9 73.9 24.2 372 
Planning processes 2.2 53.8 44.1 372 
Training 1.6 68.0 30.4 372 
Integrity 5.6 83.6 10.8 372 
Public awareness activity 3.2 67.5 29.3 372 
Accessibility of 
information to electors 
8.1 79.0 12.9 372 
Communication to 
candidates & agents 
0.3 54.4 45.3 371 
Source: Electoral Commission, http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk  
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Interval variables Mean Min Max 
Integrity index 15.8 11 21 
Electorate density 10.62 .07 97.77 
EA Spending (£ per elector) 4.38 1.17 10.69 
Partisanship (Combined % seats for 
Labour & Lib Dems) 
41.65 0 100 
Internal migration (‘000s) .1 -8.8 8.1 
% students 6.38 3.42 25.59 
% long term unemployed .93 .22 2.40 
% never worked 2.29 .74 11.63 
% routine workers 9.23 2.26 18.58 
    
Other Variables  N  
Concurrent local elections   163  
Multiple constituencies  154  
Two-tier district councils  197  
Unitary districts  44  
London borough  32  
Unitary County  9  
Metropolitan districts  36  
Scottish unitaries  31  
Welsh unitaries  22  
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Table 4: OLS Regression on British electoral administration index 2010 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables b (S.E.) Beta b (S.E.) Beta b (S.E.) Beta 
Constant 15.588 .167  14.724 .461  14.149 .765  
Electorate density .007 .009 .046 -.002 .014 -.014 -.005 .013 -.038 
Multiple constituencies .714 .243 .162**
* 
.670 .343 .156* .917 .276 .213**
* 
Concurrent elections -.466 .255 -.107* -.543 .321 -.126* -.573 .290 -.133** 
EA spending (£’per 
elector) 
   .238 .093 .169** .256 .086 .182**
* 
Partisanship    -.007 .006 -.080 -.009 .007 -.099 
Unitary Districts    .253 .437 .041    
London Borough    .588 .737 .079    
Unitary County     -.007 .876 .000    
Metropolitan districts    .891 .574 .120    
Scottish Unitary    .801 .481 .111*    
Welsh Unitary    .207 .601 .022    
Internal migration       .002 .134 .001 
Routine %       .058 .061 .073 
Never worked %       .325 .164 .215** 
Long term unemployed %       -.755 .435 -.169* 
FT Students%       .030 .052 .040 
          
R²  .034   .096   .097  
N  370   297   295  
Note: b = Unstandardised regression coefficients; Beta = standardised regression coefficients; *** Statistically significant at 
the .01 level; ** statistically significant at the .05 level; * statistically significant at the .1 level. 
 
 
38 
 
 
1 Add acknowledgement (blinded here for peer review – contained on separate title page). 
2 See also Norris (2014: Appendix B) 
3 Although some evidence about the broader concept of electoral integrity, described earlier in the article, in 
advanced democracies is beginning to be collected (See Norris 2014).      
4 For Australia, see the Australian Electoral Commission webpage ‘AEC Organisational Structure’: 
http://www.aec.gov.au/about_aec/structure.htm [27/10/15].  
5 Complete spreadsheets with RO data are available from:  http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-
information-by-subject/performance-standards/performance-in-running-elections-and-referendums 
[15/11/13].  
6 This excludes the 18 constituencies in Northern Ireland which is exempt from these performance standards 
and has different arrangements with the province-wide Electoral Office of Northern Ireland responsible for 
administering most elections there.  
7 Integrity is used in a much narrower way in the Electoral Commission standards than in academic usage 
discussed in this article, referring in the performance standards to the accurate counting of eligible votes. 
8 For the full list of criteria for each standard, see Electoral Commission (2009a).  
9 Pennings et al. (1999: 96-97) note that a Cronbach’s Alpha score of .7 or over means that the component 
indicators of such an index are suitable and that creating an index from such variables ‘adds to the discriminating 
power of the theoretical concept’.      
10 Data on concurrent elections was taken from the Guardian’s summary of the 2010 local elections, available 
at: http://www.theguardian.com/society/table/2010/may/07/local-elections [22/11/13].  
11 While a council’s boundaries may overlap several constituencies, it is not necessarily the case that that 
council’s RO administers each of those constituencies as they may be run by neighbouring councils. It is often 
far from clear from council websites which constituencies they are responsible for administering where this is 
the case, since they often report the results for all the constituencies their residents may have parliamentary 
representation in. In the absence of precise numbers, this variable is a simple indicator of whether they are likely 
to be responsible for multiple constituencies or not. I am grateful to Phil Thompson and Gemma Rosenblatt of 
the Electoral Commission  for providing data in this regard for English councils. Data for Scottish and Welsh 
councils was estimated from their websites by the author.             
12 Data for this were drawn from local election briefing papers between 2007-2010 produced by the House of 
Commons Library, available at: http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ [10/6/2015].  
13 For example, the Twitter feed @UKElectionLaw is run by a high-profile Liberal Democrat activist.   
14 These data are available in Excel spreadsheet form from the Electoral Commission at: 
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/performance-standards/financial-
information [9/4/2014]. 
15 Internal migration data is from ‘Internal Migration by Local Authorities in England and Wales mid-2010’ 
available at http://www.ons.gov.uk [23/2/2015] and for Scotland from ‘Local Area Migration 2012’ which 
contains data from 2006-2012, available at http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/statistics/theme/migration/mig-
stats/local-area-reports.html [23/2/2015].   
16 It is recognised that treating the dependent variable as an interval variable for OLS regression when it is 
essentially an ordinal 15 point scale may not be ideal. Nevertheless, the practice of using OLS under such 
conditions is widespread and accepted, under certain conditions, in the quantitative and research literature 
(Andersen, 2004; Andrews et al., 2005). For the preliminary analysis at hand it is therefore appropriate, not least 
since the aim is an exploratory determination of the nature of relationships between various variables and 
election quality. The regressions were also run with missing values replaced by the mean to increase the N 
available for analysis. These analyses are not reported here due to space considerations, but broadly corroborate 
the findings.  
17 The reference category for council type is two tier districts.  
18 Tested for because of the relatively small N involved in this study. 
19 A case of electoral fraud in these elections was also upheld against the elected Mayor, who was removed from 
office by an election court (BBC, 2015).   
20 Comparison of means shows this difference is statistically significant at the p<.01 level. Eta measures of 
association are mid-range strength at .574 and .329 respectively. 
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21 ROs running concurrent contests spent on average £620,363 while those running only the parliamentary 
contest spent £430,182. The difference is statistically significant at the p<.01 level, but the eta and eta-squared 
measures are weak at .282 and .080 respectively. An interaction term of the number of constituencies run and 
amount spent was tested for in models 2 & 3 in a previous version of this paper, not shown here because of 
space limitations. In neither model did it attain statistical significance.    
22 Spending was also tested as the total amount spent on EA expressed as £’000s. This was also statistically 
significant in model 3 at the p<.05 level in both models 2 and 3. The results are not shown due to space 
limitations.  
